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Looking Back to Move Forward: 
Using History to Understand the 
Consensual Forest Management 
Model in the Terai, Nepal1
long struggle has been going on world-
wide between the state, local people and 
various stakeholders over the control, 
management and use of forest and land 
resources. In particular, in the history of 
many agrarian political economies of the 
developing world there have been confl icts 
over forest resources between local people 
and the state. An analysis of historical pat-A
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terns of annexation of forest and land by the state and the resultant 
struggles by local people against state takeover is fundamental to 
understand the emergence of various debates around global forest 
management.2 For most of the twentieth century, the dominant ap-
proach to conservation of forest and, in general, natural resources 
was to exclude people from ‘natural’ places and restrict access to, and 
use and control of, these places by local populations. In the later dec-
ades of the twentieth century, the role of powerful and centralised 
state agencies in forest management began to be questioned, and 
there were increasing calls for public involvement and participation 
(under diff erent names and according to diff erent models of forest 
management, such as participatory management, community for-
estry, co-management, collaborative management, joint forest man-
agement etc.). As a result, a variety of forest management policies 
and practices currently exist worldwide, sometimes in direct confl ict 
with one another, at other times coexisting without friction. Th ese 
policies and practices have been constantly rearticulated and trans-
formed historically in response to wider changes in political, eco-
nomic, social and natural environments.3 Th ey have also had various 
impacts on forests, forest-dependent people, local users, and other 
stakeholders. Th rough the historical case of Terai forestry in Nepal, 
1 Th is paper is an off shoot of the author’s doctoral thesis, which researched Terai 
forestry using an environmental justice framework (P. Satyal Pravat, Understanding 
Environmental Justice in the Developing World: Th e Case of Forest Management Policy 
and Practice in the Terai, Nepal, PhD Th esis, Th e Open University, Milton Keynes 
2009). Th e paper draws from a combination of secondary sources, the author’s own 
experience of working in the agriculture and forestry sector in Nepal, and two em-
pirical fi eld trips in Nepal (November 2006-February 2007 and July-August 2007) 
involving both informal interactions and formal interviews with a range of Terai 
forestry stakeholders. Feedback to earlier drafts was provided by David Humphreys 
and Joe Smith of Th e Open University. Th e paper also benefi tted from the com-
ments of John Dargavel and two other anonymous referees.
2 M. Doornbos, A. Saith, B. White, “Forest Lives and Struggles: An Introduc-
tion”, in Forests: Nature, People and Power, M. Doornos, A. Saith, B. White (eds), 
Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 2000, pp. 1-10.
3 O. Springate-Baginski, P. Blaikie, Forests, People and Power: Th e Political Ecol-
ogy of Reform in South Asia, Earthscan Publiations, London 2007, p. 2.
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this paper examines the impacts of past policies and politics, and the 
underlying conflicts of interest between stakeholders, particularly 
the state and local people. 
Considerable debate and increasing conflict exists in Nepal today 
between the government and community forestry activists over the 
issue of who should manage the Terai forests in the southern plains. 
Most forest areas in the Terai are state-controlled, although active day-
to-day forest management is usually lacking. The government has 
shown a deep reluctance to hand over the Terai forests for community 
management as demanded by community forestry activists. A series 
of other attempts to bring the Terai forests under alternative manage-
ment plans (such as the collaborative model advocated by the govern-
ment, which consists of a joint partnership with the local stakehold-
ers) have been largely ineffective.4 As a result, Terai forestry exhibits a 
state of confusion and stalemate in terms of forest management policy 
and practice. Given the contemporary context of a changing political 
landscape in Nepal, with, on the one hand, an allegiance between the 
main political parties and the Maoists and, on the other, the ethnic 
struggle of the Madhesis (‘people of the plains’), who demand more 
political rights in the Terai, it is time to initiate a dialogue among the 
various stakeholders of Terai forestry on how to get out of this dead-
lock and find a transparent, accountable and consensual form of forest 
governance.5 In this context it might be useful to step back and exam-
ine how past politics and policy have historically affected the forests, 
local people and the interactions between them in the Terai. 
4 Although both community forestry and collaborative forest management are 
forms of participatory forest management, there are important differences between 
them. In the latter model there is a decreased level of participation of local users 
and restricted access to and control of revenues from forests, compared to full con-
trol and 100 per cent benefits to local users in the former. These differences are at 
the root of the disagreements on how Terai forests should be managed in Nepal. 
5 Since 2006, Nepal has gone through a number of radical changes in the 
political landscape, most notably the peace agreement between the Maoist rebels 
and the government (2006), the election of a Constituent Assembly to write a 
new constitution, the formation of a new coalition government of major political 
parties, and the declaration of a federal republic following the end of the monar-
chy (all in 2008).
GE99
Adopting an approach to history as ‘dialogue between the past 
and present’, this paper attempts to provide a brief history of forest 
politics in the Terai focussing on the role of the state and its rulers 
in equity and ecological issues.6 I argue that Terai forestry has his-
torically been an inequitable domain that principally benefi ted the 
state and ruling classes, with ordinary Nepali people not receiving 
a fair share of the benefi ts from forest management. My review of 
the socio-political and environmental history of the Terai also sug-
gests that concern for environmental conservation was not a prior-
ity until recently, as the earlier governments were more interested in 
exploiting the area’s high-value forests for commercial purposes. Th e 
historical role of the state in the control of the Terai forests is a major 
legacy that continues to infl uence contemporary forestry policy and 
practice in the region. Th is, I argue, helps to explain the reluctance 
of the forest bureaucracy to adopt transparent and accountable forest 
governance in the Terai, as well as the state’s policy of restricting the 
handover of Terai forests for community or more decentralised forms 
of participatory forest governance to only a small part of the forests.
While in the hills of Nepal local forest user groups have been 
successful in preserving forests through well-established community 
forestry practices, there exist confl icts over the management of the 
Terai forests, arising from diff erences in view between donors, Nepa-
lese environment and development non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), community forestry activists, and the government. Th e 
main challenges for sustainable Terai forestry have been support-
ing the creation of new institutions for forest management, address-
ing increased user group heterogeneity and inequity, complicated 
resource-settlement patterns that raise equity issues for distant users 
(mainly Madhesis), the existence of large high-value forests, and the 
proximity to the timber market in India, which stimulates a lucra-
tive trade in illegal timber. 
If managed effi  ciently, it is argued, the Terai forests could not 
6 Th e approach of exploring past policy and politics in order to understand 
contemporary issues in Nepal was developed by a noted Nepali historian, the 
late Mahesh Chandra Regmi. See M.C. Regmi, Landownership in Nepal, Adroit 
Publishers, Delhi 1977. 
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only boost the local and national economies but also assist in en-
vironment conservation.7 However, given the historical context of 
inequitable and ecologically unsustainable forestry practices in the 
Terai, which continue to shape current forest politics and policy in 
the region, the question of how equity and ecological issues can be 
addressed remains important. In the new political situation in Ne-
pal, after years of instability and conflict, with its emphasis on eq-
uity, inclusive democracy and state restructuring, and in the context 
of the existing logjam in Terai forest governance, it is timely to ask: 
Why and how should Terai forestry be restructured and democra-
tised? Who benefits from Terai forestry, and how? Who – or what 
– loses, and why? To answer these questions and guide future actions 
it is important first of all to examine Terai forestry in an historical 
context. Hence in this paper I provide a brief historical overview of 
forestry policy and practice in the Terai which, I argue, could offer 
some valuable lessons for the present problems of forest governance 
in the region. Before reviewing past forest politics, including a brief 
look at the environmental and socio-political history of the Terai, I 
give a brief introduction to the region and then move on to discuss 
its socio-economic heterogeneity and inequity.
The Terai
The name Terai or Tarai refers to the southern lowlands of Nepal 
(see Figure 1). This region consists of an extension into Nepal of 
the Gangetic plains of northern India (generally referred as the outer 
Terai) and the river valleys located between the Siwalik (Chure) and 
Mahabharat ranges (the inner Terai). The region extends from east to 
west along the entire length of Nepal. The southern part of the Terai 
(outer Terai), bordering on India, is mostly under agriculture and 
7 In fact, in 1999, the World Bank estimated that the annual profits from 
timber production in the Terai could value around US $160 million in addition 
to the environmental benefits from the forests, if they were managed properly. I. 
Hill, Forest Management in Nepal, World Bank Technical Paper N. 445, World 
Bank, Washington DC 1999.
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densely populated (mainly by Madhesis), whereas the forested north-
ern part (inner Terai), known as the Bhabhar, has a lower population 
density (of Pahadiyas, that is, people of hill origin). While the Terai 
covers roughly only about one-fi fth of the total area of Nepal, almost 
half of the Nepalese population lives in the region today.8 
Unlike the sparse and low-value forests in the hills, Terai forests are 
high-value and productive. Th e continuous stretch of dense forests 
extending along the Terai from east to west was popularly known as 
Char Koshe Jhadi (roughly translatable as ‘Four-Mile Strip’), and is one 
of the few remains of the vast forest resources that previously existed 
in the region. According to the latest available data on forest cover, 
the Terai plains now include about 4,873 km2 of forestlands outside 
national parks and wildlife reserves, the dominant species being high-
value hardwoods such as Sal (Shorea robusta) (43 per cent of total stem 
volume). A single mature Sal tree may fetch US $ 1000 or more.9 
In addition to high-value forests, the Terai is also considered to 
be the grain basket of Nepal, having higher agricultural productivity 
than anywhere else in the country. Rice, jute, sugar cane, mustard, 
tobacco, herbs and spices are the main agricultural products. Th e 
Terai’s agricultural surplus, particularly its surplus of rice (the sta-
ple food of most Nepalese), not only supports the food defi cit hill 
regions of Nepal but is also exported to India (both legally and il-
legally). Th us the importance of the Terai for the Nepalese economy 
is signifi cant. However, increasing migration from the hills and from 
India and the resulting pressure of agricultural expansion on forest-
land have hindered the capacity of the Terai to make a sustainable 
contribution both to the economy and to the environment.
Unequal citizens in an unequal region: socio-
economic heterogeneity and inequity in the Terai
To understand the social and ecological implications of the history 
8 Nepal Government, National Census-2001, Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Kathmandu 2001. 
9 Winrock International, Emerging Issues in Community Forestry in Nepal, 
Winrock International, Kathmandu 2002.
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of forest politics in the Terai, it is essential to first understand the het-
erogeneous nature of Terai society and the resultant conflicts of inter-
ests and power imbalances between a number of very diverse groups. In 
general, the inequities in Terai society reflect inequalities and differences 
prevalent in the social and spatial structure of Nepalese society, which is 
highly stratified in terms of class, income, caste and ethnicity, gender, 
religion and culture. Although in Nepal there are over 103 castes and 
ethnic groups, at least 92 different languages or dialects, and more than 
ten different religions,10 Nepal remained the sole Hindu kingdom until 
2007, when the Interim Constitution made it a secular state. 
Traditionally, people from the top two castes based on Hindu 
hierarchy – Brahmins and Chhetriyas – shared power with the ruling 
monarchs and have largely dominated and benefited from the state 
Fig 1. Map of Nepal showing the Terai region in the south
Source: adapted from www.undp.org.np (accessed 24 January 2011).
 
10 Nepal Government, Statistical Pocket Book 2004, Central Bureau of Statis-
tics, Kathmandu 2004.
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bureaucracy since the proclamation of the state of Nepal in 1768. 
Th e feudal or semi-feudal nature of Nepalese society – involving 
privilege, patronage, the domination of particular classes in socio-
political life and the perpetuation of regional and ethnic inequality 
and gender and caste discrimination – has further aggravated ineq-
uitable power relations.11 
Th e composition of Terai society is complex. Th ere are some in-
digenous groups – mainly Th arus – and increasing migrants from 
the hills of Nepal and from India. Except for the hill migrants (Pa-
hadiyas), the people of the Terai are commonly known as Madhesis. 
Th eir ancestors established themselves in the Terai in remote times 
and share languages and cultures with the Madhesis living south of 
the Nepal-India border. Th e caste Hindus from India, of Indo-Aryan 
origin, are believed to have started migrating to the region at the 
end of the second millennium BC, preferably to the foothills on the 
northern edge of the Terai, probably because it was easier to clear for-
est for agriculture there than in areas closer to the Ganges in India.12 
Although Madhesis are often regarded as a single group, they include 
caste Hindus (with Dalits at the bottom of caste hierarchy), Muslim 
minorities, and various tribal groups, including the original inhabit-
ants, the Th arus (who have, however, recently characterized themselves 
as non-Madhesis). Th e Th arus were the main original inhabitants of 
the Terai. Th ey were forest-dwellers and made their living as hunters-
gatherers, and had some immunity to aulo, a virulent form of malaria 
that plagued the region until the 1950s. When increasing numbers of 
migrants bought, or sometimes illegally seized, large tracts of valuable 
agricultural land, the Th arus became the minority in most places and 
are now marginalised and severely disadvantaged in many ways.  
Historically, and even today in public discourse, Madhesis have 
been considered outsiders in Nepal. Th ey are excluded from many 
spheres of national life. As will become clear later in this paper, the 
Nepali sense of common national identity has largely been identi-
11 World Bank, DFID, Unequal Citizens: Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion in 
Nepal – Summary, World Bank, DFID, Kathmandu 2006.
12 J. Whelpton, A History of Nepal, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2005, p. 14.
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fied with the hills rather than the Terai. Furthermore, in the past the 
state’s rhetoric and portrayal of Nepali nationalism as being based on 
the dominance of the Nepali language and loyalty to the ruling elites 
mainly benefited hill Brahmins and Chhetriyas, who shared common 
cultural characteristics, spoke the same language and were generally 
loyal to successive rulers. This form of Nepali nationalism excluded 
the people of Terai, most of whom spoke languages other than Nepali 
(mainly Awadhi, Bhojpuri and Maithili, the latter being spoken by 
the largest number of speakers in Nepal after Nepali itself ) and had 
close links with North Indian culture. The worst form of exclusion 
for many Madhesis was the continuous apathy and neglect of succes-
sive Nepalese governments with regard to the citizenship problem.
Among the inhabitants of the Terai, only a handful of those who 
were successful in forging alliances with the ruling elites benefited 
from the Nepali state. The wealthiest Tharus and Madhesis with po-
litical connections across Nepal and the neighbouring Indian states 
of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh felt relatively secure, whereas ordinary 
Tharu and Madhesi peasants were merely preoccupied with day-to-
day economic survival. 
Although the Terai people were neglected at the national level, the 
region as such still received some benefits from the state. Its gentle 
morphology, contrasting with the steep hills and rugged mountains of 
Nepal, allowed the construction of extensive road networks and oth-
er facilities and services such as electricity, telephone, and tube wells 
(mainly in the eastern Terai). The region has hence witnessed impres-
sive growth, despite the Kathmandu-centric overall development pat-
terns in Nepal. However, rural-urban income inequality is generally 
worse in the Terai than elsewhere. Due to a biased state development 
policy concentrating on Kathmandu and the eastern region while ne-
glecting the west (mainly the unprivileged Karnali region), the western 
Terai districts suffer from severe inequalities by most development and 
health indicators. Society in these districts is still feudal, with a high 
concentration of landless agricultural labourers working as bonded la-
bour (Kamaiya) or seasonal agricultural labour (Haliya). On the other 
hand, in the eastern Terai cities the level of development is to some 
extent comparable to that of the Nepalese capital.
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A history of forests politics in the Terai: 
a case of equity or ecology?13
Because the equity and ecological issues in Terai forestry cannot 
be understood in an historical and socio-political vacuum, I will 
now provide a brief overview of the socio-political and environmen-
tal history of the Terai. It will be clear from the following discussion 
that in the past the state and ruling elites remained the major – and 
sometimes the only – benefi ciaries of the Terai forests, exploiting 
them disproportionately for various purposes. Nepali rulers used the 
forests to generate revenue from the exploitation of their natural 
resources and establish agricultural areas in them to pacify and co-
opt political rivals. Some of the revenues were used to maintain the 
large army the rulers needed to deal with rebellion, treachery and 
uprisings. A closer look into the political economy of Nepal from an 
historical perspective suggests that only a few ruling elites at the cen-
tre, and the local elites that arose subsequently under the impulse of 
the country’s autocratic political system and feudal social structure, 
were allowed to benefi t from the Terai forests. 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the surplus from 
agricultural production and forestry was largely channelled toward 
the maintenance of a military establishment to support territorial 
expansion after the unifi cation of Nepal.14 During the Rana peri-
od (1846-1951), revenues from the Terai forests were used for the 
maintenance of the aristocracy and state bureaucracy. Th e oligarchic 
regimes of the Shahs and Ranas before 1951 had always depended 
on the select classes of society to maintain their authority, but the 
13 For earlier critical and analytical histories of Nepalese forestry, see, among 
others, Y.B. Malla, “Changing Policies and the Persistence of Patron-client Rela-
tions in Nepal”, in Environmental History, 6, 2, 2001, pp. 287-307. A.P. Gau-
tam, G.P. Shivakoti, E.L. Webb, “A Review of Forest Policies, Institutions, and 
Changes in the Resource Condition in Nepal”, in International Forestry Review, 
6, 2, 2004, pp. 136-148. Given the dominant focus of previous works on com-
munity forestry in the mid-hills of Nepal, I preferred to concentrate my analysis 
on the less studied but equally interesting, as well as contested and complicated, 
case of Terai forestry. 
14 M.C. Regmi, Landownership in Nepal, Adroit Publishers, Delhi 1977, pp. 190 ff . 
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exploitation of forests by a privileged few continued even after 1951, 
even when the forestry sector came under the management of the 
Forest Department. The legacy of this intense exploitation of the 
Terai forests benefiting only the state and certain privileged classes 
has endured to this day, despite the evolution of forest management 
practices towards community forestry in most of the hills of Nepal. 
The major turning points in the history of Nepal and the sub-
sequent changes in forestry policy suggest three distinct phases in 
the history of forest exploitation and management in the Terai. 
Throughout this evolution, however, Terai forestry has remained in-
equitable and unsustainable. 
1768-1951 (past history)
Before the establishment of the Gorkha kingdom (pre-1768), Ne-
pal was divided into many small principalities across the country, in-
cluding the Terai region, often at war with one another. The frequent 
fighting distracted these principalities from setting up any form of 
sustained and organized extraction of forest resources from the Terai. 
After the Gorkha ruler Prithvi Narayan Shah conquered Kathmandu 
and laid the foundations for a unified kingdom in 1768, he continued 
to pursue his ambition by conquering most of the hill areas and parts 
of the Terai. During the Gorkha kingdom phase, the forests in the 
Terai were still retained as a form of natural defensive barrier against 
enemy aggression, mainly by pre-colonial Indian rulers and British 
invaders. To maintain the integrity of the Terai forests as a natural de-
fence, various royal decrees banning settlements and cultivation were 
issued, notably in 1817, 1824 and 1826.15 While forests in the Terai 
were protected for military security until the late nineteenth century, 
in the hills incentives were given to convert forests to agriculture in 
order to reap land taxes at least as far back as the sixteenth century. 
After the unification of Nepal, the ruling Shah monarchs began 
granting large tracts of land (including some forestland in the Terai) 
15 J. Guthman, “Representing Crisis: The Theory of Himalayan Environmen-
tal Degradation and the Project of Development in Post-Rana Nepal”, in Develop-
ment and Change, 28, 1997, pp. 45-69.
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with lavish tax exemptions, thus benefi ting select classes of people 
and political favourites. Th is measure, a tactic also used by the Ranas, 
was a means for the rulers to consolidate their power. In addition, 
Terai forests provided a source of revenue to maintain the increasing 
military presence required for the ongoing geographical expansion 
of the kingdom, as well as providing opportunities for agricultural 
expansion into some selected areas after forest clearing. 
From 1846 to1951 Nepal was run by hereditary chief ministers, 
the Ranas, who superseded the monarchy and pursued a deliberate 
policy of stagnation and isolation, building grand palaces for them-
selves while investing little in public works. Th e Ranas exploited the 
Terai forests as a major resource to draw upon when they needed to 
reward their trusted adherents or conciliate their political opponents. 
Certain tracts of land in the region (both cultivated and forested) 
were granted on temporary or permanent bases in the form of Jagir 
(land assigned to a state servant temporarily in lieu of salary), Birta 
(permanent tax-free landholdings) or Guthi (revenue-free landhold-
ings for religious bodies). Th e majority of land holdings in the Terai 
were appropriated as Birta by the Ranas themselves. It was estimated 
that by the fi rst half of the twentieth century the ruling classes in 
Nepal possessed almost half of the cultivated land, with three leading 
Rana families alone owning as much as 92 km2 of land.16 
Th e Ranas sought to strengthen their control over the Terai by 
introducing a new category of offi  cials known as Jimidars to collect 
revenues from land and crops. Th e Jimidars were predominantly men 
from the hills. Madhesis were never a part of the inner core of the 
state’s administrative and political structure. Th e Jimidars, who con-
trolled local peasants and maintained close ties with the Ranas at the 
centre, later became locally-based elites and long remained the main 
bastions of Rana rule in Nepal. Th e Ranas also encouraged hill people 
(Pahadiyas) to migrate into the Terai. However, the plains being an 
alien environment, where the unbearable heat and endemic malaria 
made migration an even less attractive prospect, it is the Jimidars who 
helped to bring the majority of cultivators into the Terai from India. 
16 K. Ghimire, Forest or Farm: Th e Politics of Poverty and Land Hunger in Nepal, 
Manohar Publishers and Distributors, Delhi 1998, pp. 33-34.
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The Ranas were thus able to open up new forested land for agricul-
tural expansion and generated increasing revenues from land taxes 
and agricultural surplus for the ruling class and the military. 
The Terai forests were also exploited to supply timber to India. 
As British India expanded railway systems across the states of Bihar 
and Uttar Pradesh, the Terai became a ready supplier of hardwood 
for railway sleepers. In an effort to appease British colonialists and 
thereby retain their grip on power, the Ranas set aside some areas of 
the Terai forests as natural reserves, even taking their British coun-
terparts on hunting parties there, besides sending massive exports 
of timber and agricultural surpluses to British India. These natural 
reserves were therefore initially developed to protect game in order 
to satisfy the recreational interests of the aristocracy, rather than for 
wildlife or forest conservation per se.17 Parts of Chitwan and Bardia 
(both in Terai) that were originally designated as reserves for trophy-
hunting by the Ranas now remain as examples of biodiversity con-
servation, under their present designations of Bardia National Park 
and Chitwan National Park.
1951- 1990 (recent history) 
The second phase of forests politics in Nepal began in 1951, after 
the end of the Rana regime.18 With a new political system in place, 
achieving social and economic equity became the guiding principle 
of state policy, for the first time in the country’s history. The political 
change saw some major government reforms in two sectors, land and 
forestry, which are important pillars of Nepal’s social and economic 
life. The Birta, Jagir and Jimidar forms of landownership were abol-
ished. Through the Private Forest Nationalisation Act (1957), most 
forests that had previously been held as personal property by the Ranas 
17 K. Ghimire, Forest or Farm: The Politics of Poverty and Land Hunger in Nepal, 
Manohar Publishers and Distributors, Delhi 1998.
18 After the end of Rana rule, the sovereignty of the monarchy was restored and 
anti-Rana rebels in the Nepali Congress Party formed the government. Nepal en-
tered the international stage with membership of the United Nations in 1955 fol-
lowed by the establishment of diplomatic relationships with Western countries. 
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and local elites were nationalised and brought under state control. Th e 
nationalisation was endorsed by the fi rst elected Nepali Congress gov-
ernment (1959-60). However, the short-term impact of the introduc-
tion of centralised management of forests proved negative, since some 
forests in the Terai were cleared by private individuals and rapidly 
converted into agricultural land to evade the new provision. Moreo-
ver, the recently established Forest Department was unable to act and 
enforce rules eff ectively, mainly due to ineffi  ciency, staff  shortages, a 
harsh approach to dealing with local users, and endemic corruption. 
In the post-1951 period, the export of Terai timber to India re-
mained an important source of revenue. Emphasis was placed on 
the exploitation of Sal forests. Th e nationalisation of forests in Te-
rai provided the government with a major source of income. Th e 
role of the state as the major stakeholder in Terai forestry was fur-
ther consolidated after the 1960 takeover by King Mahendra, who 
abruptly dismissed the popularly elected Nepali Congress and took 
direct control of government under the party-less Panchayat system, 
which lasted for 30 years until its fall in 1990. During the Panchayat 
period, the introduction of controversial resettlement projects in the 
Terai from the mid-1960s onwards was closely linked to opportuni-
ties for timber extraction for sale to India. As a result, there was mas-
sive deforestation in the region, which lost 25 per cent of its forest 
cover in just fourteen years (1964-1978).19 Another driving factor 
was the proximity of the Indian timber market, which to this day 
has remained a contributory factor in Terai deforestation. Although 
only limited timber sales were licensed legally, considerable quanti-
ties of wood and timber were smuggled into India by various routes, 
including rivers and roads. Moreover, the construction of the East-
West Highway – the only major highway in Nepal linking urban 
centres other than Kathmandu with the Terai – made the felling of 
trees for commercial timber more profi table as road transportation 
became easier. However, as the price of wood and timber across the 
border in India was considerably higher than in Nepal, the Indian 
market remained attractive. 
19 J. Whelpton, A History of Nepal, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2005, pp. 122-123.
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By the 1950s, the eradication of malaria, increasing population 
pressure in the hills, and the opening of previously inaccessible areas 
made the Terai plains more attractive for new settlement. Due to its 
high production potential and the greater economic prospects it of-
fered, Terai land became one of the most sought after commodities. 
Many members of the ruling elites and the royal family as well as 
rich and powerful locals strove to gain possession of both cultivated 
and forested land in the region. In the 1950s and 1960s, vast num-
bers of migrants moved into the central and eastern Terai. From the 
1970s onwards, the western Terai also became an important destina-
tion due to increased land availability from forest clearance.
The political context in which such migration took place is worth 
mentioning here. Most of the Terai inhabitants (Madhesis with In-
dian roots) were used to the multi-party democracy and liberal poli-
cies across the border. As new migrants they felt constrained by the 
new repressive political climate in Nepal. As a result, discontent and 
dissidence grew more in the Terai than elsewhere in Nepal. In fact, 
popular opposition to the Rana regime had originated and grown in 
the eastern Terai town of Biratnagar in the 1940s and later in other 
urban pockets of the Terai and Kathmandu. Similarly, the Terai saw 
much of the growing opposition to royal rule under the Panchayat 
system. Hence, the state encouraged (both officially and unofficially) 
the Pahadiyas – who were seen as more loyal to the Hindu monarch 
and the Panchayat system – to migrate and encroach upon forest 
areas with new settlements and dwellings, in an effort to politically 
integrate the Terai people into the Panchayat system. For the same 
reason, even repatriates, mostly Gurkhas (Nepalese of hill origin 
serving in the British and Indian armies), were encouraged to return 
with promises of land in the Terai. 
When official resettlement plans were initiated in 1955, they tar-
geted ordinary farmers, who were allotted some land. However, de-
spite a ban on sale for, initially, three years, many plots were sold to 
the members of the Kathmandu elite, many of whom thus became 
absentee landlords.20 Large numbers of Sukumbasis (landless squat-
20 J. Whelpton, A History of Nepal, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2005, pp. 140-141.
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ters) also cleared forests for settlements and cultivation without offi  cial 
authorisation, although their ‘illegal’ action usually went unchecked. 
Th e reluctance to act against the Sukumbasis was due to the covert self-
interest of local politicians, for whom the Sukumbasis represented vote 
banks. Local forestry offi  cials also used these ‘illegal’ settlers to raise 
money for themselves, in addition to the money they were already 
generating from sales of wood and timber from settlement areas. 
To understand the pressures on the Terai forests from migration 
and the resulting forest/land confl icts, it is worth recalling the situa-
tion of the peasantry during this period. Most peasants were landless 
or owned very small plots of land, whereas a few large landholders 
owned sizable farms. Due to this unequal land-holding structure, 
in the 1950s and 1960s many Terai peasants were paying up to 80 
per cent of their main crop as rent. Th e 1964 Land Reform Act set 
a threshold of 50 per cent of the gross product for land rent (later 
amended to 50 per cent of the main crop), which still made the 
position of tenants insecure if the crop failed, as they were also re-
quired to bear the costs of cultivation.21 Successive political leaders 
at various times have promised to reform the landholding structure 
by reducing the amount of land per individual owner. However, no 
real changes in this direction have been made so far.22
Th e Panchayat system slogan Hariyo Ban Nepalko Dhan (‘Green 
forests are Nepal’s wealth’), believed to have been coined by King 
Mahendra and proudly spread by the Forest Department through 
national radio and pamphlets, stressed the importance of forests for 
the state and the Nepalese economy. However, the general perception 
of the common people was that the state and ruling elites benefi ted 
disproportionately from the forestry sector (which was mostly con-
centrated in the Terai forests). Th e same phrase was ridiculed by the 
21 K. Ghimire, Forest or Farm: Th e Politics of Poverty and Land Hunger in Nepal, 
Manohar Publishers and Distributors, Delhi 1998, pp. 70-77.
22 For example, eff orts to regulate land started as early as Chandra Shumsher’s 
time during Rana rule. Land reform eff orts continued at various times, nota-
bly during the Nepali Congress government (1957), King Mahendra’s direct rule 
(1964), and the Sher Bahadur Deuba’s government (2001-2002). After 2006 the 
issue has cropped up once again, although with no signifi cant progress. 
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public as Hariyo Ban Mahendra Sarkarko Dhan (‘Green forests are 
King Mahendra’s wealth’). Furthermore, alleged reports of the hando-
ver of large numbers of felling permits by Surya Bahadur Thapa’s ad-
ministration to finance the Panchayat campaign against the demand 
for multi-party democracy in the 1980 referendum contributed to a 
generally negative popular perception of the state’s role in the control 
of the Terai forests. Additionally, there were cases of corruption in the 
Timber Corporation of Nepal, which was formed in 1959 as a govern-
ment agency with a monopoly for extracting and selling timber. 
During the 1970s, while concern for environmental protection 
and conservation was mounting due to the growing debate on the 
‘Theory of Himalayan Degradation’,23 forest protection measures were 
only serving the private interests of the senior bureaucrats and forestry 
officials involved in the management and commercial exploitation of 
forests. The 1950s trend towards a nationalisation of forests was re-
versed in 1978, when community ownership and management of for-
ests was recognised and established in the hills in an effort to save the 
declining forests and reduce the risk of ‘Himalayan degradation’.24 In 
the Terai, however, the state retained its control of forests; indeed, this 
control assumed a more coercive form when more national parks were 
established for conservation purposes. This protectionist approach, 
however, rather than casting a positive light on the state as a guardian 
of nature, reinforced the belief held by many Nepalese that the state 
wanted to remain the sole exploiter of the Terai forests.
23 The theory claimed that the Himalayas and its southern plains (i.e. the Te-
rai) were heading towards an environmental catastrophe of epic proportions due 
to rapid population growth (2-3 per cent per year), intensification of agriculture, 
overgrazing, and massive deforestation in the Nepal hills. See E.P. Eckholm, “The 
Deterioration of Mountain Environments”, in Science, 189, 1975, pp. 764-770. 
This narrative of Himalayan degradation based on neo-Malthusian theory was lat-
er challenged and an alternative body of literature emerged over the years focuss-
ing on socio-economic and political approaches to explain environmental change 
in Nepal. See for example P. Blaikie, The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in De-
veloping Countries, Longman, London 1985. J. Ives, B. Messerli, The Himalayan 
Dilemma: Reconciling Development and Conservation, Routledge, London 1989.
24 D.A. Gilmour, R.J. Fisher, Villagers, Forest and Foresters: The Philosophy, Proc-
ess and Practice of Community Forestry in Nepal, Sahayogi Press, Kathmandu 1991.
GE113
Post-1990 (present forest policies and 
practices) 
It is now evident from historical accounts of past forest policies 
that continued state control, a revenue-oriented approach to forest-
ry, commercial considerations and the lack of proper forest manage-
ment policies have all contributed to the rapid transformation and 
degradation of the Terai forests. Besides these historically inherited 
features, since 1990 political instability and weakened policing have 
become contributory factors in this degradation. 
Th e post-1990 period of multi-party democracy in Nepal (the pe-
riod, that is, that followed the fi rst people’s movement or Janandolan 
I) was characterised by factionalised politics with frequent changes 
of government. During the 1990-1991 transition period from three 
decades of Panchayat rule to a multi-party system, there was consid-
erable illegal logging and deforestation in the Terai forests. Th ereaf-
ter, political instability and crisis in the country, mainly fuelled by 
the Maoists’ rebellion in the form of a decade-long ‘people’s war’ 
(1996-2006), and the royal takeovers of 2002 and 2005 also took 
a heavy toll on the forests.25 Due to increasing political instability, 
many districts of the Terai saw a sharp rise in logging. In the forests 
in the protected areas and national parks of the Terai, illegal logging 
and wildlife poaching became common. Although park boundaries 
were guarded by the Nepalese Army, there were increasing instanc-
es of confl icts between the parks and local people. After 2000, the 
army was withdrawn from many park boundaries and mobilized to 
counter the increase in Maoist violence. Th is had a negative eff ect 
on conservation of protected areas, with armed poachers and loggers 
becoming more active. 
Since the political change of 2006, which was brought about by 
massive protests against royal rule in the form of the second people’s 
movement (Janandolan II), once again an increasing trend towards the 
degradation of Terai forests began, and has gone one to this day due 
to the transient nature of national politics in Nepal. Organized illegal 
25 P. Satyal Pravat, Forestry Sector in Nepal: A Country Profi le Report, Forests 
Monitor, Cambridge 2004, pp. 11-12.
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logging and massive tree felling by illegal contractors and traders have 
increased in the Terai, often with the direct or indirect support of local 
forest officials, senior members of local forest user groups, and some-
times cadres and officials of the political parties in power.
While Terai forestry has been a victim of volatile national politics, 
forests in the Terai have historically been used as a ‘cash cow’ to meet 
the vested interests of political parties and bureaucrats. As a result, the 
Forest Department and Forest Ministry still suffer from the historical 
legacy of a corrupted image due to their increasing involvement in the 
politicisation of the Terai forests and the misuse of revenues for finan-
cial and political purposes.26 This was a common practice during the 
authoritarian rule of the Panchayat era, but continued into the 1990s 
with alleged reports of the personal involvement of forest ministers 
in abuse of authority and malpractice. Some large illegal concessions 
were handed out to local contractors to win political favours and elec-
tions, as well as make quick money. (Somewhat ironically, the office 
of Forest Ministry was usually assigned to a Terai minister.) Although 
there was no reported case of granting concession rights to Western 
multinational logging companies (a lucrative malpractice indulged in 
by local politicians in many developing countries), one such attempt 
was resisted with huge public and media protests.27 
In the country’s fluid political situation, another factor in the 
mismanagement of Terai forests was the unwillingness of the forest 
bureaucracy to respond to the new political context. Despite rein-
statement of multiparty democracy in 1990, the introduction of a 
26 In the interim cabinet formed after 2006, the Ministry of Forests and Soil 
Conservation was under a Maoist minister, Matrika Yadav, who publicly acknowl-
edged on several occasions that the Forest Ministry was still plagued with endemic 
corruption (The Himalayan Times, 18 June 2007). In informal conversations with 
the present writer, this claim was endorsed by at least two ex-forest ministers. During 
my field study, many low-level staff in the districts such as forest guards and rangers 
also had several anecdotal accounts of corrupt practices within their department. 
27 As a result, in 1996 the government’s plan to grant concession rights to a 
Finnish company, Enso International, had to be dropped. See N.K. Shrestha, C. 
Britt, “Another Balanced Overview: An Equation with More than Money”, in 
FTTP Newsletter No. 32-33, Forest Trees and People Programme, Swedish Uni-
versity of Agriculture Sciences, Uppsala 1997. 
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decentralized forest policy, increasing political awareness at the local 
level, and the emergence of civil society in the forestry sector (in 
the form of forest user groups and their networks, as well as various 
forestry NGOs), technocratic domination of forest policy contin-
ued in Nepal, most particularly in the Terai forests. Th e forest bu-
reaucracy in Nepal was founded on a notion of forestry emphasizing 
centralised management of timber for state interests with foresters 
and rangers trained in traditional scientifi c forestry adapted from 
the colonial education system of India. Due to this long historical 
schooling and organization culture, forest bureaucracy in Nepal is 
still dominated by technocratic rationality over deliberative prac-
tice (in the form of dialogue, debate and discussion) and is resist-
ant to refl ective change and power shifting.28 Th e reluctance of the 
forest bureaucracy to radical change was not, however, unexpected 
given the reluctance to reform strategic areas of national develop-
ment exhibited by successive post-1990 governments. Th is inertia 
and resistance to change was contrary to the spirit and aspirations 
of Janandolan I and still works against the transformation of Terai 
forest governance after Janandolan II.
Th e centralized character of the Nepali state was particularly 
evident in its management of Terai forestry. Th e state maintained 
control of most forest areas in the Terai, and held a monopoly on 
timber harvesting and marketing through its subsidiary, the Timber 
Corporation of Nepal. Although the Corporation was deprived of 
its dominating position in 2000, the sale of timber is still far from 
being conducted in a free market regime. Th ere were some attempts 
by subsequent forest policies to respond both to the changed internal 
political context and to external pressure in favour of participatory 
governance of natural resources, but due to the state’s contradictory 
stance these measures did not result in any fundamental changes in 
Terai forestry. While support for the community forestry programme 
in the hills was legalised and institutionalised through enforcement 
of the Forest Act (1993) and Forest Regulations (1995), most of the 
28 B. Pokharel, H. Ojha, Community Forestry in Nepal: A Platform for Public 
Deliberations or Technocratic Hegemony?, Discussion Paper, Forest Action, Kath-
mandu 2006.
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Terai forests remained under government control. Although the 1993 
Forest Act did not apply any restrictions for the handover of forests 
by the government to local communities for community manage-
ment anywhere in Nepal, including the Terai, the controversial Re-
vised Forestry Sector Policy of 2000, introduced amidst oppositions 
from community forestry activists and forestry NGOs, restricts the 
handover as ‘community forests’ in Terrai to barren land, shrub land 
and isolated patches of degraded land,29and concomitantly stipu-
lates that large continuous areas of productive forests in the Terai 
will remain under the centralized control of the state, in many cases 
under the surveillance of the Nepal Army and armed forest guards; 
although in some cases the collaborative management of these areas is 
envisaged. The Revised Forestry Sector Policy of 2000 does envision 
collaborative forest management in the Terai as an alternative to the 
dominant model of community forestry in the hills, including the 
distribution of benefits and revenues among the central government, 
local government and local users (although inequitably, with 75 per 
cent of the revenues flowing to the central treasury while only 25 per 
cent remains with the local government and users). The revised 2000 
policy also aims to solve the critical issue of inclusion of distant users, 
mainly Madhesis, which the current policy and practices of the hill 
model of community forestry does not address. However, opponents, 
mainly community forestry activists, see this policy merely as a tactic 
to consolidate government control over forest revenue. These argu-
ments and counter-arguments with regard to forestry policy in the 
Terai have turned from polarized conceptual debates into field-level 
conflicts. As a result, neither the collaborative nor the community 
forestry models have gathered momentum in the Terai. 
I have argued that forest management policy in the Terai has 
been a complex, hotly debated and politically controversial issue in 
Nepal. While many NGOs, including the influential FECOFUN 
(Federation of Community Forestry User Groups) with more than 
29 See Nepal Government, Forest Act 1993 and Forest Regulation 1995, Min-
istry of Forests and Soil Conservation, Kathmandu 1995. Nepal Government, 
Revised Forestry Sector Policy 2000, Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation, 
Kathmandu 2000.
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14,000 forest-user group members across the country, want the 
handover of the Terai forests for community management, the state 
wants to retain them under its control or at least under collaborative 
management. Th e position of the multilateral and bilateral donors 
active in the Terai forests has also been divided, with some directly 
or indirectly supporting community management (mainly CARE-
International and the Department for International Development-
DFID) and others supporting the government’s protectionist ap-
proach for biodiversity conservation (notably the SNV-Netherlands 
Development Organization and the World Wild Fund for Nature-
WWF). FECOFUN and community forestry activists accuse the 
government of using its revenue-oriented policy of collaborative 
management to maintain its control over the nation’s valuable forest 
resources. Th ey make the case that those forests that were handed 
over as community forests before the state developed its policy of 
collaborative management are on the whole protected and managed 
much better than under earlier government control, and in several 
cases benefi t the poorest groups.
However, as advocated by many community forestry activists, 
there are some practical challenges to translating the success of com-
munity forestry as practiced in the hills to the Terai. Unlike the hills, 
the Terai has no history of community-based collective action, let 
alone a history of community forest management; hence, one fun-
damental challenge is to create a new organization of community 
forest user groups. Larger forest sizes, recent settlements, problems 
in identifying and organizing user groups, the existence of attractive 
timber markets nearby, together with widespread and organized ille-
gal timber felling, all create additional obstacles to community man-
agement in this region. Th e concerns about equity between proxi-
mate users (mainly Pahadiyas) and distant users (mainly Madhesis) 
also presents a complex and pressing issue in the case of the Terai, as 
most forests lie far away from the settlements, unlike the hill com-
munity forests where local communities live near forest patches. 
Due to these problems and the Forest Department’s desire to 
maintain its control over high-revenue forests, community forestry 
has been widespread only in the hills, while in the Terai its introduc-
tion and success has been more problematic. Th e handover process 
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has been slow and has been stalling for the last few years (as of Oc-
tober 2006, out of a total of 14,337 community forest user groups 
formed across Nepal, only 1,330 are in the Terai).30 The policy of 
the government and some major donors to enforce collaborative 
management models for most Terai forests has encountered active 
resistance and opposition from the community forestry lobby. Due 
to this, no further progress has been possible in terms of forest gov-
ernance reform, as the government has been unable to achieve much 
without active support from the relevant stakeholders. 
This latest phase of forest politics in the Terai originates from con-
flicts of interests between the various stakeholders and highlights the 
complicated case of Terai forestry. In some way, the present conflict 
can be understood as the perpetuation and reproduction of historically 
unequal power relations and the inequitable distribution of costs and 
benefits from the forestry sector in the Terai. The historical legacy of 
state forest policies, the superseding of local subsistence needs by na-
tional commercial interests, and the forest bureaucracy’s tacit support 
of the status quo have all acted to hinder forest governance reforms in 
the Terai. In this context, it is essential to acknowledge and learn from 
past mistakes, and recognise that the continued centralised control of 
Terai forestry is reproducing historical social, economic and political 
inequalities; indeed, the present state of affairs, with contested and 
divisive conflicts between the community forestry and collaborative 
forest management lobbies, has further aggravated it.
With Terai forestry now in a state of stagnation and in the context 
of Nepal’s rapidly changing political landscape, potentially heading 
towards a federal republican structure, there is an increasing realisa-
tion and consensus among various stakeholders that urgent inter-
vention is needed to introduce appropriate institutional mechanisms 
to benefit the poor and marginalised while ensuring the long term 
sustainable management of the forest resource. Yet this immediately 
leads to the question of how such reforms can be achieved, and by 
whom. Based on my exploration of the history of forest politics in 
the Terai, my argument is that recognising and reflecting upon the 
30 Nepal Government, Database of the Community Forest User Groups in Nepal, 
Department of Forests, Kathmandu 2006.
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historical mistakes of past policies might help to answer this ques-
tion. Only by understanding the historical context can the future 
course of forest politics in Nepal be guided towards the needs of 
local communities and the exigencies of the long term sustainable 
management of the resource.
Conclusion 
Th is paper began by outlining and discussing the historical roots 
of the socio-economic inequalities that have informed forest politics 
in the Terai and which continue to infl uence current forestry policy 
and practice in the region. Th e dominance and monopoly of the 
state in the forestry sector has resulted in an unequal distribution 
of the benefi ts fl owing from the forest sector, creating the historical 
conditions for inequity in Terai forestry. Only relatively few people, 
particularly those who dominate the state machinery and power pol-
itics, have benefi ted from Terai forestry, whereas ordinary Nepalese 
- most of whom depend on farms and forests for their survival and 
livelihood – have been denied an equitable share of the benefi ts.
Even today, the legacy of inequitable distribution of the benefi ts 
from Terai forestry remains, shaping and infl uencing the forest man-
agement and governance policies of the state in the region. Th e revenue 
from forests continues to contribute a signifi cant portion of Nepalese 
national income, which explains why the state has insisted on retaining 
its major stake in forests. Th is has had consequences for the ecology of 
the region, as the main motive of the state has been to retain its mo-
nopoly over the region’s valuable forests for economic reasons, rather 
than to preserve their ecological integrity. An historical overview of 
Nepal’s political economy also makes it clear that old power relation-
ships remain more or less intact in all strata of Nepalese society, and 
this is also true of the forestry sector. Over the last three centuries, 
the practice of exploitation of Terai forestry has been institutionalized 
fi rmly within the state bureaucracy. As a result the question of how to 
change this power structure in order to create the conditions for equity 
and ecological sustainability has become an important issue. 
If managed effi  ciently, the forests of Terai have the potential to 
boost the local economy, while also generating signifi cant revenue 
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for Nepal as a whole. However, given the consequences of years of 
political instability and the continued reluctance of the state to en-
gage in democratic, participatory and inclusive governance, it has 
yet to be seen whether transparent, accountable and sustainable Te-
rai forestry can be achieved in the near future. If the state retains 
its leading role, given its commercial interest in timber extraction 
and its reluctance to promote a governance framework involving all 
stakeholders, there is a risk that Nepal will squander the Terai forest 
resources with no long-term benefit to the country and its people. 
The future shape and role of Terai forestry will need to be con-
sistent with the wider societal and political changes of the country 
towards peace, justice, inclusive democracy and equitable develop-
ment. In the post-2006 Janandolan II period, most prominently 
after the election of a constituent assembly to write a new constitu-
tion, the latest political discourse is of building a ‘new Nepal’ organ-
ised along federal and multicultural lines, a decentralised, inclusive 
and just nation rather than a unicultural, centralized one. If Terai 
forestry is to cohere with this vision it will require a significantly 
altered policy framework and a concomitant shift in the historical 
positions, power and roles of the state and the Forest Ministry. If 
consensual solutions are to be found, it will also require a restructur-
ing and democratisation of policy processes with an increased em-
phasis on more open and deliberative dialogues between the various 
stakeholders of Terai forestry.
There are no easy answers to what model might be appropriate 
for the sustainable management of the Terai forests. The opening 
of more forests to community management and a modification of 
the current institutional framework of community forestry so as to 
include distant users might be one option. Another option might be 
to modify the collaborative forest management model by introduc-
ing further devolution of power and control and increased repre-
sentation and participation of communities, followed by legislative 
changes and encouragement for affirmative action to include poor 
and disadvantaged groups. It might also be the case that new solu-
tions can be found beyond the limited options of community and 
collaborative management, in an innovative management model in 
tune with the federal republican structure of the country in the new 
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constitution. My contention is that only through constructive dia-
logue and vigorous discourse can we fi nd an appropriate way that 
could herald the beginning of a new phase in the forest history of the 
Terai, fi nally fulfi lling aspirations to a just, transparent, accountable, 
and sustainable forest governance in the region. 
In conclusion, an observation can be made on the global rel-
evance and importance of this case study, as the research and analy-
sis discussed in this paper can provide useful insights in assessing 
similar cases elsewhere. Given the unfortunate fact that there are 
other regions of the world where very serious confl icts are in course 
between communities and forest users and the state and/or local 
elites over the ownership and management of forests, the ideas and 
experience gained from the investigation of the case of the Terai 
forests could help to improve our understanding of such confl icts 
worldwide, most particularly in the developing world. In many de-
veloping world contexts we fi nd similar debates on forestry policy, 
with polarised opinions on who should manage the local forests. 
Th ere remain similar ambiguities, dilemmas and reluctance in the 
forest administrations of many countries, and many agrarian politi-
cal economies share similar local structural inequalities preventing 
the poor and disadvantaged groups from eff ectively voicing and de-
fending their resource interests and claims.
